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OBOGS?
OBOGS?
Definition: This core qualification involves the ability to meet organizational goals and customer expectations. Inherent to this ECQ is the ability to make decisions that produce high-quality results by applying technical knowledge, analyzing problems, and calculating risks.
JPALS2
Definition: This core qualification involves the ability to manage human, financial, and information resources strategically.
V-22 JPALS incentive?
In the summer of 2016, I developed a novel incentive approach which ultimately reduced the total contract price of an ACAT 1 program by 2%. This was a failure: the incentive was designed to reduce Total Ownership Cost (TOC) by adding incentive payments, increasing contract price. Nonetheless, I am proud of how the incentive was structured to align Navy and Contractor interests, and how broad the consensus was that this was the right path forward.
In the late spring of 2016, I was the lead Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) engineer on the Joint Precision Approach and Landing System (JPALS). For various reasons, we were under pressure to sign a new contract, and were on track to get one at the end of the summer. As I suddenly learned, we also intended to directly incentivize reliability improvement. This was bad: All the low-hanging fruit had been plucked earlier, and the only obvious reliability increases might significantly increase TOC –JPALS was likely to pay an incentive fee and also realize increased TOC. Worse, it would poisoned an unusually good contractor relationship by paying them more to deliver a less sustainable system. I asked for and was given a few days to build a better option.
In principle, the solution is simple: if we want lower costs, we simply incentivize the contractor to lower our costs. Unfortunately that is much easier said than done, but here was an opportunity to make it work. Over the next few days, I developed and documented a metric which paralleled TOC, but was simplified enough to put on contract. Three obstacles remained: it needed a simple method of estimating prices, it needed some proof that every way of increasing incentive payment would redound to the Navy's benefit, and it was novel enough to need careful explanation. Each problem was solved.
For cost estimating, I leveraged trust I had built with the 4.2 Cost experts. Although by policy 4.2 will not release their detailed cost models, Jordan and Megan were some of the best cost estimators I have ever worked with. Working together, we were able to identify a more basic estimating method which they could still endorse as valid, but which was releasable and unambiguous enough for contracting.
For proof of goodness, I was lucky. I had recently been looking into a general purpose analysis tool (Octave) as a potential way of modelling system-of-systems availability. I had abandoned that effort as ineffective, but Octave was ideally suited for producing multi-dimensional graphs of TOC over the entire possibility space of JPALS design changes. Not only would we be able to prove that increased incentive fee would always correlate with better performance, the proof was an impressive-looking visual.
Definition: This core qualification involves the ability to build coalitions internally and with other Federal agencies, State and local governments, nonprofit and private sector organizations, foreign governments, or international organizations to achieve common goals.
JPALS 1
Building Coalitions is challenging enough when working from the top down, but my greatest success came when I had no positional authority.
Nearly ten years ago, I was a lowly CSS contractor supporting R&M Engineering on the Joint Precision Approach and Landing System (JPALS). JPALS was an ACAT 1 program originating in early '90s to develop a system based on GPS which could replace the current ground-radar-based navigation and landing systems, including in areas with degraded or denied GPS. Very cool stuff. The basic technology had been demonstrated years earlier, but the program had hit various snags. I had arrived just in time for Milestone B, and departed shortly before Milestone C. After a long delay for a nasty protest and a thorough-but-rapid run to PDR, I faced several key challenges: IETMs support, FMECA quality, and